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NOTES
American Transfer & Storage Co. v. Brown: Motor Carrier
Liability for Misrepresentations Resulting in
Property Damage-The Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act Versus the
Carmack Amendment
Raymond J. Brown sought to move his personal belongings from Irving,
Texas, to Fairbanks, Alaska. Brown contacted American Transfer and
Storage Company (American) to inquire about American's services.' An
American agent represented to Brown that American would provide door-
to-door service, including careful packing, movement, delivery, and place-
ment in the plaintiffs residence, and would furnish certain types of con-
tainers and vaults to assure safe delivery. Brown, relying on these
representations, entrusted his goods to American for shipment to Alaska.
When the shipment arrived, most of the goods had been either damaged or
lost. Brown brought an action under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices--Consumer Protection Act2 to recover treble damages for the loss of
property and mental anguish suffered. American defended, arguing that
the Carmack Amendment 3 to the Interstate Commerce Act 4 preempted the
DTPA, and that property damage would not support an award of damages
for mental anguish. The jury found that American's representations were
deceptive trade practices and thus awarded Brown damages for both prop-
erty loss and mental anguish. Reasserting all defenses raised at the trial
level, American appealed to the court of civil appeals of Dallas. Held, re-
versed and remanded.5 The DTPA is not preempted by the Carmack
Amendment, but a recovery for property damages under the DTPA will
not support a claim for mental anguish damages. American Transfer &
I. American was not an interstate carrier, but served as an agent for interstate carriers
and as a packer of goods for interstate shipment. As neither the court nor the parties stated
otherwise, it is assumed that American was subject to all laws, regulations, and rules that
apply to common carriers.
2. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979), as amended
in 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 603, §§ 1-10, at 1327-32 (Vernon) [hereinafter referred to
and cited as the DTPA].
3. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11707 (West Supp. 1979). The Carmack Amendment provides uni-
form legislation concerning carrier liability for loss of, or damage to, goods transported in
interstate commerce. Prior to the enactment of Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1453 (1978), the
Carmack Amendment was codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 20(11), (12).
4. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101-11916 (West Supp. 1979).
5. The appellate court reversed and remanded based on its finding that the trial court
improperly excluded from evidence payments made to Brown under an insurance policy
obtained by Brown through American.
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Storage Co. v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ
granted).
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE DTPA BY THE CARMACK
AMENDMENT
A. Federal Preemption and Interstate Commerce
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution establishes fed-
eral law as the supreme law of the land.' Accordingly, when a state law
regulates an area in which Congress has prohibited state regulation, the
state law must fall.7 Moreover, even if Congress does not foreclose the
states from regulating an area, a state law is preempted to the extent that it
conflicts with federal law.' Occasionally, a conflict will be found to exist
when compliance with federal and state law is physically impossible.9
More often, however, a conflict is found when state law obstructs the "ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."' For example, in Perez v. Campbell" the Arizona Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act was challenged on the ground that it conflicted
with the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The Arizona statute provided that dis-
charge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any judgment based on
liability for an automobile accident did not relieve the judgment debtor
from the requirements or sanctions of the state statute.' 2 The declared
purpose of the Arizona statute was to protect users of highways from
financially irresponsible drivers.' 3 In contrast, the declared purpose of the
Federal Bankruptcy Act was to give debtors a new opportunity in life
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States ... and all treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby ...."
7. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1976); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S.
624, 633 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1976). See generally Comment, A Frameworkfor Preemp-
tion Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978); Note, The Preemption Doctrine. Shifting Perspectives
on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
9. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1962).
10. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 526 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52,67 (1941). The Supreme Court decides each claim of preemption on the basis of
the peculiarities and special features of the regulatory scheme in question. City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973). The Court will look at such
factors as the purposes and objectives of the state and federal statutes, Perez v. Campbell,
402 U.S. at 652, the state interest being asserted, Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445 (1960), local police power concerns, Kelly v. Washington ex re.
Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1937), the express or implied intent of Congress, Douglas v.
Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 280-82 (1977), preemptive language, or lack thereof,
within the federal statute, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 329
(1973), and dominant federal interests, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-05 (1956).
Ii. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
12. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (West 1976).
13. 402 U.S. at 644.
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without being hampered by preexisting debt.' 4 Expressly overruling the
rationale in two of its prior decisions, 15 the Court stated that it would no
longer follow a doctrine by which state law would be upheld as long as the
purposes of the state and federal statutes differed.' 6 Instead, the Court
concluded that state legislation is invalid when it frustrates the full effec-
tiveness of federal legislation.' 7 Accordingly, the Arizona statute was
struck down because it forced bankrupts to pay their debts despite the
Bankruptcy Act's provision for discharge of those debts.' 8
Despite the language in Perez, the Supreme Court has displayed great
deference to state law regulating interests that are historically within the
police powers of the states; '9 only when Congress clearly had intended its
enactment to control exclusively have state laws regulating such interests
fallen.2" For example, in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit2
14. Id at 648.
15. Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v. Mealey, 315 U.S.
33 (1941). As in Perez, both Kesler and Reitz involved conflicts between the Bankruptcy Act
and state financial responsibility laws.
16. 402 U.S. at 651-52.
17. Id at 652.
18. Id at 654, 656.
19. See, e.g., New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 99 S. Ct. 1328, 59
L. Ed. 2d 553 (1979) (financial welfare of state's citizens); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc.,
431 U.S. 265 (1977) (protection of marine food supply); Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (prevention of water pollution); Florida Lime & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (prevention of consumer fraud and misrep-
resentation); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (prevention
of air pollution).
In New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 99 S. Ct. 1328, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553
(1979), a recent decision discussing federal preemption, a plurality of the Supreme Court
stated that they would not lightly set aside state laws "of general applicability that protect
interests 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.' With respect to such laws, the
Court has stated 'that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, the Court will
not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.'" Id at 1341, 59 L. Ed.
2d at 568 (citations omitted). How much deference will be given to state laws of general
applicability cannot be determined from the Court's decision. In a separate concurring
opinion, Justice Brennan implied that he was not certain what characteristics a law should
have to be classified as a law of general applicability. Id at 1344, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 572. In
another concurring opinion, Justices Blackmun and Marshall stated, "The crucial inquiry is
whether the exercise of state authority 'frustrate[s] the effective implementation of the [fed-
eral statute's] processes,' not whether the State's purpose was to confer a benefit on a class of
citizens." Id at 1346, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 574. The dissent, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Powell, flatly rejected the test of general applicability as the primary considera-
tion in a preemption analysis. Id at 1350, 59 L. Ed. 2d 579-80. With at least five Justices
rejecting the test of general applicability, that test should not predominate in future preemp-
tion cases. This is not to say, however, that the Court will depart from its past position of
according deference to state laws that are enacted to protect fundamental and deeply rooted
state interests. What the concurring and dissenting Justices appear to be stating is that a
state law does not necessarily involve a deeply rooted state interest merely because it pro-
tects a class of citizens.
20. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (federal statute with objec-
tive of securing a uniform system of regulation for oil tanker safety features invalidated state
law regulating same subject even though state law aimed at water pollution); Douglas v.
Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (state statute aimed at conserving marine food
supply invalidated by congressional intent that such conservation regulations be even-
handed and nondiscriminatory).
21. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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the Supreme Court took special note of Congress's concession that air pol-
lution is a matter peculiar to state and local concern.22 The Court cited
legislative history evidencing congressional intent to preserve and protect
the rights of states to control air pollution.23 Accordingly, the Court held
that a city ordinance regulating boiler emissions was not preempted by a
federal statute approving boilers that produced emissions exceeding the
levels permitted by the city ordinance.24 The Court's preemption analysis
centered on the purposes of the federal and state statutes. It observed that
the purpose of the local ordinance was to control air pollution levels while
the purpose of the federal statute was to insure that seagoing vessels were
reasonably safe.2" The Court concluded that the statutes did not overlap
in either scope or purpose, and therefore they were not in conflict.2 6
Another example of federal deference to state regulation is Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers v. Paul,27 in which the United States Supreme Court
held that a state statute regulating the quality of avocados transported into
the state was not preempted by a federal statute that regulated the quality
of avocados exported from one state to another.28 The Court reasoned
that the state had a fundamental right to protect its citizens from inedible
commodities that are represented as edible.29 The Court characterized
such representations as frauds upon the public,30 and concluded that the
state's interest in proscribing such fraud and misrepresentation could be
overcome by a federal statute only when Congress clearly expressed an
intent to preempt the field.3'
Since Huron and Paul, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that problems directly affecting the health, welfare, and safety of the local
public are deeply rooted local interests. 32 As in Huron, subsequent deci-
sions concerning deeply rooted state interests have given special considera-
tion to the purpose and scope of the state regulation when determining if
the state law obstructs the accomplishment and execution of the purposes
and objectives of the federal statute. The Court's consistency in upholding
state statutes that provide for the health, welfare, and safety of the public
indicates that the scope of the direct conflict test is narrowed to provide
special consideration for such state interests.
22. Id at 445-46.
23. Id
24. Id at 446.
25. Id at 442, 445.
26. Id. at 446.
27. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
28. Id at 146.
29. Id. at 144.
30. Id
31. Id at 144, 152.
32. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 378.
See generally Sisk, State Environmental Protection Versus the Commerce Power, 13 U. RICH.
L. REV. 197 (1979); Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context- A Unified
Method ofAnalysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 202-03 (1978); Note, State EnvironmentalProtec-
tion Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762, 1769-72 (1974).
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B. Purpose of the Carmack Amendment
In 1906, Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment33 to the Interstate
Commerce Act. The Amendment provides exclusive legislation34 on the
duty of interstate carriers to issue bills of lading35 for movement of inter-
state shipments, on the liability of a carrier for damage to, or loss of, goods
being transported under a bill of lading contract, and on the ability of a
carrier to limit its liability for damage to, or loss of, an interstate shipment
by rule, regulation, or contract.36 By these provisions, Congress intended
33. Ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593 (1906) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 11707 (West
Supp. 1979)).
34. When Congress comprehensively regulates an area of commerce pursuant to its
power under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, the states may no longer regulate that area. See, e.g.,
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (federal statute with objective of securing
an international uniform system of regulation for all tanker safety features invalidates state
law regulating same subject); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973) (pervasive nature of federal regulation of aircraft noise and need for uniformity in
regulation of aircraft noise preempts state law regulating same subject); Southern Ry. v.
Reid, 222 U.S. 444 (1912) (federal legislation seeking uniformity on subject of interstate
carrier's responsibility to accept shipments preempts state law on same subject). In Adams
Express Co. v. Groninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1912), the Supreme Court stated:
That the [Carmack Amendment] supersedes all the regulations and policies
of a particular State upon the same subject results from its general character.
It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier under a bill of lading
which he must issue and limits his power to exempt himself by rule, regulation
or contract. Almost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that
there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession
of the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it.
35. A bill of lading is a document evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued
by a person in the business of transporting goods. U.C.C. § 1-201(6); TEx. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.201(6) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
36. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06 (1912). In Adams Ex-
press the plaintiff directed the carrier to transport a package from Ohio to Georgia. The
plaintiff failed, however, to declare the value of the package. The defendant's rates were
graduated according to the declared value of the package. Because the plaintiff had failed to
declare a value, defendant applied its lowest rate applicable to shipments being transported
from Ohio to Georgia. The bill of lading issued to the plaintiff provided that the defendant's
liability for loss of, or damage to, goods would not exceed $50 unless the shipper declared a
greater value at the time of shipment. Plaintiffs goods were lost in transit and plaintiff filed
a claim for their full value, which exceeded $50. Defendant, relying on its limitation of
liability clause, refused to pay an amount in excess of $50. Plaintiff contended that defend-
ant's limitation of liability clause was void under Ky. CONST. § 196, which provides that a
common carrier cannot by contract relieve itself of common law liability. The United States
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs claim, holding that the Carmack Amendment provided
exclusive legislation on the subject of carrier liability under a bill of lading contract. 226
U.S. at 505-06. Under the Carmack Amendment, a carrier's stipulation limiting recovery to
an agreed value when the rate is based on the agreed value is valid. Id at 512. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs claim was denied. Id
State regulations with only an incidental effect on the subject matter of the amendment
may not be preempted. For example, in Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412
(1914), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant carrier to recover the value of
goods lost by the defendant. The plaintiff was allowed recovery under the Carmack Amend-
ment for the loss and, pursuant to a state statute, was awarded limited attorneys' fees. Id at
415. The Supreme Court held that the state regulation did not directly conflict with the
Carmack Amendment. Id at 420-21. The regulation merely authorized an injured party to
recover a portion of the costs incurred in recovering for his injuries, as opposed to an author-
ization to enlarge or limit carrier responsibility for loss of, or damage to, interstate ship-
ments. Id But cf. Strickland Transp. Co. v. American Distrib. Co., 198 F.2d 546, 547 (5th
Cir. 1952) (claim for attorneys' fees in suit brought under Carmack Amendment cannot be
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to free interstate shipments from diverse state judicial and statutory laws
that had made it difficult for both shippers and carriers to know the extent
of carrier liability for damage to, or loss of, goods transported in interstate
commerce.
37
Transactions Within the Purview of the Carmack Amendment. The provi-
sions of the Carmack Amendment are limited to a statement of the rights
of a legal holder of a receipt or bill of lading issued by an interstate carrier
and the responsibilities of a carrier to such a holder. The Supreme Court,
however, has expanded the scope of the Amendment beyond its express
provisions. For example, in New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v.
Nothnagle31 the Supreme Court held that a railroad is liable to a passenger
for the loss of baggage entrusted to the railroad's employee. Without re-
ceiving a receipt, the plaintiff had handed her suitcase to a redcap while
waiting to board a train.39 The Court found that since the redcap was a
railroad employee performing functions incident to interstate transporta-
tion, the loss of plaintiffs suitcase was reached by the terms of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.4" Although neither a bill of lading nor a receipt had
been issued to the claimant, the Court concluded that the provisions of the
Carmack Amendment, an integral part of the Interstate Commerce Act,
governed the railroad's liability for loss of the entrusted goods.4
In Texas the Carmack Amendment has been extended to cover agree-
ments collateral to the bill of lading contract. In Southwestern Motor
Transport Co. v. Valley Weathermakers, Inc. 42 a plaintiff asserted that his
claim for freight damages was governed not by the amendment, but by an
independent agreement that had been entered into between the plaintiff
and the carrier after plaintiff's shipment had been damaged. The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument and held that the post-transportation
agreement was so intimately connected with the original interstate transac-
tion that it became a part thereof and therefore was controlled by the Car-
mack Amendment.43
considered for jurisdictional purposes); Southwestern Motor Transp. Co. v. Valley
Weathermakers, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. 1968) (state statute that allowed award of unlim-
ited attorneys' fees in action brought under Carmack Amendment held inoperable in this
fact situation).
37. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1912). See also Atlantic Coast
R.R. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186, 199-203 (1911).
38. 346 U.S. 128 (1953).
39. Id at 129.
40. Id at 130-31. The Court stated that the Carmack Amendment's exception for bag-
gage carried on passenger trains applied only to free baggage checked through on a passen-
ger fare. This exception does not apply to a redcap service, for which the railroad exacts a
charge separate from the passenger fare, because the cost of such service is not an element of
the determination of passenger rates. Id at 134.
41. Id at 130-32.
42. 427 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex. 1968).
43. Id at 604. The controversy between the parties related to the recovery of attorneys'
fees. An action for damages under state law would have allowed recovery for attorneys' fees
whereas an action under the Interstate Commerce Act would not. Id at 599. See Strickland
Transp. Co. v. American Distrib. Co., 198 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 1952).
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The Carmack Amendment expressly provides that nothing in the
amendment deprives a holder of a receipt or bill of lading of any right of
action that existed prior to adoption of the amendment.' The United
States Supreme Court initially construed this provision to include only
rights of action that a holder had under preexisting federal law.45 In
Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co 46 however, the
Supreme Court expanded the scope of the amendment, holding that it was
broad enough to embrace all damages resulting from a carrier's failure to
perform its duties with respect to its transportation function.47 Thus, when
the carrier breached its common law duty to timely deliver an interstate
shipment, the claimant's measure of damages was controlled by the Car-
mack Amendment.48 The principle enunciated in Pastime Amusement was
subsequently applied to the carrier's common law duties to advise a ship-
per of impending delay of a shipment,49to furnish suitable equipment for
transportation,5 0 and to transport goods safely.5
Damages Under the Carmack Amendment. The general measure of dam-
ages under the Carmack Amendment is either the cost of repair for dam-
aged goods or the value of the lost goods.5 The amendment, however,
allows recovery of all damages that result from the carrier's loss of or dam-
age to an interstate shipment. 3 Relying on the amendment's broad lan-
guage, some courts have extended a carrier's liability beyond actual loss by
awarding exemplary damages to a plaintiff whose action is based on a car-
rier's willful breach of its common law or federal statutory duties.5 4 Exem-
plary damages have been awarded to a plaintiff when a carrier's willful
pre-contract misrepresentations and deceit were a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's damage.55 Under federal law, however, an award of exemplary
damages may be made against the principal only when the principal either
participates in the willful and wanton act or ratifies it.
5 6
44. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11707 (West Supp. 1979).
45. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1912).
46. 299 U.S. 28 (1936).
47. Id at 29.
48. Id
49. Gold Star Meat Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 438 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1971).
50. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Brinke, 450 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. Mitchell v. Union Pac. R.R., 188 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
52. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11707 (West Supp. 1979); Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Texas Packing
Co., 244 U.S. 31, 37 (1917); F.J. McCarty Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 428 F.2d 690, 692 (9th
Cir. 1970); W.A. StackPole Motor Transp., Inc. v. Malden Spinning & Dyeing Co., 263 F.2d
47, 48 (5th Cir. 1958). See generally Skulina, Liability of a Carrier For Loss and Damage to
Interstate Shipments, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 251 (1969).
53. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11707 (West Supp. 1979). See also Southeastern Express Co. v. Pas-
time Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28, 29 (1912).
54. See Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 1224, 1226-28 (4th Cir. 1976);
Miller v. AAACON Auto Transp., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-06 (S.D. Fla. 1978). But cf.
Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967) (punitive damages
not allowed when carrier and shipper agreed upon limited carrier liability).
55. Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., I 1 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1974).
56. Mitchell v. Union Pac. R.R., 188 F. Supp. 869, 874 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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C. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act pro-
tects consumers against misleading, false, and deceptive business prac-
tices. 7 Three of the provisions of the DTPA are designed specifically to
ensure enforcement of the Act. First, any waiver by a consumer of the
provisions of the DTPA is unenforceable. 8 Secondly, the DTPA is to be
construed liberally to promote its underlying purpose of protecting con-
sumers against unlawful conduct. 9 Thirdly, an adversely affected con-
sumer may recover treble damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and court
costs.6" The strength of these provisions and the vigor with which they
have been enforced reveal a fundamental concern by the Texas Legislature
and courts that consumer expectations be protected.6 '
II. AMERICAN TRANSFER & STORAGE CO. V. BROWN
The principle issue in Brown was whether the DTPA is preempted by
the Carmack Amendment.6 2 This determination involved a two-step proc-
57. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979). Amend-
ments to the following sections became effective August 27, 1979: §§ 17.43, .45(9), .46, .50,
.50A, .56. Sections 17.50B and 17.56A are new additions. 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch.
603, §§ 1-10, at 1327-32 (Vernon).
The scope of the DTPA is made broad by the definitions of consumer, goods, and services.
Section 17.45(4) defines a consumer as any "individual, partnership, corporation, or govern-
mental entity who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." Subsection
I defines goods as including "tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for use."
Subsection 2 defines services as including all "work, labor or service purchased or leased for
use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods."
58. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
59. Id § 17.44. The number of cases allowing relief under the DTPA indicates that
Texas courts are adhering to the legislative mandate to construe liberally and enforce the
DTPA. See, e.g., Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1978) (declaring list of decep-
tive trade practices enumerated in the DTPA is nonexclusive); Woods v. Littleton, 554
S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977) (representation that builder would repair all defects in house); Woo
v. Great Southwestern Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.) (representation by corporation to prospective distributor that experience, back-
ground, and special abilities were not necessary to become a successful distributor); Burnett
v. James, 564 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ dism'd) (representation by
seller of air conditioning unit that unit would be adequate to serve buyer's needs); MacDon-
ald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (representa-
tion that builder would change carpet in house); Boman v. Woodmansee, 554 S.W.2d 33
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (company's failure to install swimming pool in good
and workmanlike manner was breach of warranty of good workmanship). But cf. Singleton
v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ filed) (because award of
treble damages is of penal nature, deceptive acts must be committed knowingly).
60. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act,
ch. 216, § 5, at 603. One commentator suggested that this provision not only penalized vio-
lators of the DTPA, but also served as an incentive for consumers to pursue their claims.
Comment, What Hath the Legislature Wrought? A Critique of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act as Amended in 1977, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 525, 543 (1977).
61. See Comment, supra note 60, at 529.
62. The court was also presented with three minor issues. The first issue was whether
the trial court improperly excluded from evidence American's limitation of liability clause.
Brown claimed that the clause was void because the clause represented a waiver by a con-
sumer of the provisions of the DTPA. The court of civil appeals agreed with the plaintiff,
but held that the clause was admissible on other grounds. 584 S.W.2d at 291.
The second issue was whether the lower court erred in excluding evidence that Brown had
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ess: first ascertaining the respective scope and purposes of the state and
federal statutes, and then deciding the constitutional issue of whether the
two statutes are in conflict. The Dallas court of civil appeals held that the
Carmack Amendment does not preempt the DTPA as to deceptive trade
practices that occur before the parties enter into a bill of lading contract.63
To arrive at this holding, the court formulated the test of federal
supremacy as follows: "Whether under the circumstances of the particular
case the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '
The court compared the established purposes of the Carmack Amend-
ment and the DTPA. Citing Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,65 the court
stated that the purpose of the Carmack Amendment is to establish uni-
formity both in the requirements of a contract of carriage in interstate
commerce and in the carrier's liability for breach of that contract.66 In
contrast, the court observed that the purpose of the DTPA is to protect
consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive acts or practices.67
Thus, the court concluded that the purposes of the acts did not overlap.
68
Furthermore, while the DTPA regulates misrepresentations generally, the
court found that the Carmack Amendment is limited to regulating prac-
tices that occur after the execution of a bill of lading contract. 69 Accord-
ingly, as American's representations were made prior to execution of the
bill of lading, the court held that damages resulting from the representa-
tions were not within the purview of the Carmack Amendment.7 °
The court's support for this conclusion rests on the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of De-
troit 7 l and Askew v. American Waterways Operator's, Inc. 72 These cases,
received approximately $11,000 for damage to goods under an insurance policy he had
purchased through American. The court held that exclusion of the evidence was reversible
error. Id at 293, 298. Brown contended that the collateral source rule supported the exclu-
sion of the insurance coverage and settlement. The collateral source rule, an exception to
the general principle, allows multiple recovery for the same loss. See T.L. James & Co. v.
Statham, 558 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. 1977). The purpose of the rule is to deny wrongdoers
any benefit from insurance coverage independently obtained by the injured party. See
Graves v. Poe, 118 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1938, writ dism'd). In Brown,
however, the court found that the rule was inapplicable because the insurance coverage had
not been independently obtained, but was for the benefit of both Brown and American. 584
S.W.2d at 293.
The third issue was whether the special issues were defective. The court found that they
were defective, 584 S.W.2d at 295, relying on Spradling v. Williams, 566 S.W.2d 561, 564
(Tex. 1968).
63. 584 S.W.2d at 288-89. The court indicated that misrepresentations that affect the
applicable carrier rate might fall within the purview of federal regulation. This exception
would appear to be mandatory because a carrier is bound by federal law to apply the proper
rate. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11904 (West Supp. 1979).
64. 584 S.W.2d at 288.
65. 226 U.S. 491 (1912).
66. 584 S.W.2d at 288.
67. Id at 288-89.
68. Id
69. Id at 289.
70. d. at 290.
71. 362 U.S. 440 (1960); see notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
72. 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (state statute imposing strict liability for damages caused by oil
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however, are easily distinguished from Brown in that Huron and Askew
deal with state regulation of local pollution problems. In the absence of
clear congressional intention to preempt the field, the Supreme Court will
uphold state law regulating such deeply rooted local interests.7 3 Consis-
tent with the reasoning in these cases, the Dallas court of civil appeals
could have found that the DTPA protects a deeply rooted state interest by
concluding that the DTPA's prohibition against false, misleading, and de-
ceptive acts is an exercise of the state's right to protect its citizens from
fraud. Such a conclusion finds precedential support in Florida Lime & Av-
ocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul.74
Even though the Dallas court of civil appeals failed to identify a deeply
rooted state interest, it concluded that the DTPA does not obstruct the
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the Carmack Amend-
ment because the purposes and scope of the two statutes do not overlap.'-
The Supreme Court, however, has held that the preemption analysis
should not focus only on whether the statutes are aimed at similar objec-
tives; rather, the analysis must inquire whether both statutes can be en-
forced without obstructing "federal superintendence of the field."76 By
enacting the Carmack Amendment, Congress intended to free interstate
shipments from diverse state judicial and statutory laws that had made it
difficult for both shippers and carriers to know the extent of carrier liabil-
ity for damage to or loss of goods transported in interstate commerce.
77
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that a state regulation that broad-
ens the scope of carrier liability concerning an interstate shipment is an
impermissible interference with congressional intent to supervise exclu-
sively this area of carrier liability.78 The Dallas court of civil appeals mea-
sured Brown's damages by the value of his lost and damaged goods, the
measure that would have been used had the Carmack Amendment ap-
plied.79 Applying the DTPA, however, the court trebled Brown's actual
damages, thereby enlarging the extent of American's liability. Under the
court of civil appeals' holding, a carrier operating in several states is again
subject to diverse measures of damages, thus destroying the uniformity in
carrier liability sought by the Carmack Amendment. The court's holding
also creates the opportunity for shippers to shop for a forum that would
allow recovery beyond the provisions of the Carmack Amendment, a re-
sult that the Texas Supreme Court has expressly recognized as violative of
the intent of the amendment.8
0
spills not preempted by federal statute imposing strict liability for clean-up costs of an oil
spill).
73. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
74. 373 U.S. 132 (1963); see notes 27-31 supra and accompanying text.
75. 584 S.W.2d at 289.
76. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
77. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1912).
78. See Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1914).
79. 584 S.W.2d at 289. See also note 52 supra and accompanying text.
80. Southwestern Motor Transp. Co. v. Valley Weathermakers, Inc., 427 S.W.2d 597,
603-04 (Tex. 1968).
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The Brown court concluded that representations made prior to execu-
tion of the bill of lading contract are not within the scope of the Carmack
Amendment. 8' Judicial precedent, however, suggests that the bounds of
the Carmack Amendment are broader than those suggested by the Dallas
court of civil appeals. The United States Supreme Court has held that
activities, if incident to the interstate transportation of goods, are within
the amendment's scope, even if taking place before the bill of lading is
issued.82 In Brown American's representations, although occurring before
the bill of lading was signed, were intimately related to the transportation
of Brown's goods and therefore should be within the ambit of the amend-
ment. This is not to suggest, however, that American's representations are
irrelevant to Brown's claim for damages. The Supreme Court has held
that the amendment is broad enough to embrace all damages resulting
from a carrier's failure to perform its duties with respect to its transporta-
tion function. 3' Exemplary damages have been awarded under the Car-
mack Amendment when a carrier made willful precontract
misrepresentations that were the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.8 4 If
Brown could show that American's representations were willful and the
proximate cause of his injury, then he should be entitled to an award of
exemplary damages.
The court of civil appeals concluded that protection of interstate ship-
pers from carriers' deceptive practices has been left to the police powers of
the states. The court, however, failed to consider collateral federal legisla-
tion. 5 The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 6federal sister of the
DTPA, 7 indicates the congressional attitude towards the use of deceptive
trade practices by motor carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.
The FTCA expressly exempts interstate carriers from its provisions.8" Al-
though legislative history fails to explain the reason for the exemption, the
statute is unequivocal in stating that interstate carriers are not to be gov-
erned by the FTCA's provisions proscribing deceptive practices. The
81. 584 S.W.2d at 290.
82. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. Nothnagle, 345 U.S. 128 (1953); see notes 38-43 supra
and accompanying text.
83. Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936); see notes
44-51 supra and accompanying text.
84. Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1974).
85. The United States Supreme Court has found it proper to consider collateral federal
legislation when determining if state law is preempted by federal law. See New York Tel.
Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 99 S. Ct. 1328, 1341-43, 59 L. Ed. 2d 553, 566-67(1979), in which the plurality relied on the legislative history of the Social Security Act to
support its finding that the National Labor Relations Act did not preempt states from grant-
ing unemployment benefits to striking workers.
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45 (1976).
87. Section 17.46(c)(1) of the DTPA provides that courts construing the DTPA are to be
guided, to the extent possible, by the Federal Trade Commission Act. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.46(c)(1) (1978-1979) (current version at 1979 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 603,
§ 3, at 1329 (Vernon)).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1976).
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states, when applying their own statutes regulating deceptive practices,
should take cognizance of this congressional exemption.
A second issue before the court in Brown was whether a consumer
whose primary injury is property damage can recover damages for mental
anguish under the DTPA. The court of civil appeals held that such dam-
ages are not recoverable.89 Brown had conceded that according to estab-
lished common law, mental anguish could be compensated only when
suffered in connection with physical harm or with intentional invasion of a
plaintiffs personal security and peace of mind.9° He argued, however, that
the language of the DTPA created a new cause of action for mental
anguish, independent of proof of any other harm. 9' To establish injury
under the Act, Brown reasoned, a consumer need only show that he has
been adversely affected.92 Since the Texas Legislature had directed ex-
pressly that the terms of the DTPA be construed liberally, 93 Brown con-
tended that a liberal interpretation of "adversely affected" should include
mental anguish.94 The court rejected Brown's contention, noting that the
DTPA made no mention of mental anguish95 and citing with approval
Dennis Weaver Chevrolet, Inc. v. Chadwick,96 in which the Beaumont court
of civil appeals held that the recovery of mental anguish damages was still
dependent on common law rules. Such a decision was wise, the Dallas
court stated, because alleged injury due to emotional distress is difficult to
rebut, has no monetary measure, and is limited only by the jury's sympa-
thy and the reviewing court's conscience. 97
The Dallas court of civil appeals rejected the assertion that Woods v.
Lttleton98 supported the recovery of damages for mental anguish under
the DTPA.9 9 The court observed that the issue of whether mental anguish
is a proper element of actual damages under the DTPA was not before the
Texas Supreme Court in Woods. 'I Any reference by the Woods court to
damage for mental anguish under the DTPA, therefore, was dictum and
not binding on the lower courts.'0 '
89. 584 S.W.2d at 297.
90. Id at 296.
91. Id at 296-97.
92. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 216, § 5, at 603. In the 1979 amendments, however, the
term "adversely affected" is replaced by the term "actual damages." 1979 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv., ch. 603, § 4, at 1329 (Vernon). This Note does not speculate on what effect the change
of terms will have on future interpretations of the DTPA.
93. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); see note 59 supra
and accompanying text.
94. 584 S.W.2d at 296.
95. Id at 297.
96. 575 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. 584 S.W.2d at 297.
98. 554 S.W.2d 662, 672 (Tex. 1977).
99. 584 S.W.2d at 297.
100. Id at 297-98.
101. Id at 298.
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